All vulnerabilities
GHSA-6fj4-rcr3-r7rrRUSTSEC-2026-0187

lopdf has a stack overflow via deeply nested PDF objects

lopdfrustLibraries & packages
CVSS
7.5High
ExploitationNo known exploitationNot in CISA KEV, which does not prove it is unexploitedCISA KEV
Exploit odds (EPSS)No scoreNo FIRST EPSS score in this snapshot yet
Fixed in0.42.0Fixed versionGitHub
Published16 Oct 2026Updated 17 Oct 2026GitHub

What fixes it

  • 0.42.0lopdf, rustGitHub
  • 0.42.0lopdf, crates.ioOSVcargo update -p lopdf --precise 0.42.0

A fixed version on one release line is not the upgrade target for every line. Check your exact version and any vendor backports.

Description

lopdf::Document::load_mem (and the other load* entry points) parses nested PDF arrays and dictionaries with unbounded recursion. A small crafted PDF whose Catalog contains a deeply nested array (/X [[[ … ]]], on the order of 10,000 levels) exhausts the call stack and aborts the process with SIGABRT.

Because this is a stack-overflow abort rather than a panic!, it cannot be caught with catch_unwind: any service that parses untrusted PDF input with lopdf can be crashed by a ~21 KB file, resulting in a denial of service.

Confirmed on lopdf 0.41.0 and earlier; fixed in 0.42.0. Default configuration, no features changed.

Proof of concept

fn main() {
    let bytes = std::fs::read("poc.pdf").unwrap(); // ~10,380-deep nested array in the Catalog
    let _ = lopdf::Document::load_mem(&bytes);     // stack overflow -> SIGABRT
}

An equivalent PoC is a minimal PDF whose Catalog /X value is "[" * 10380 + "]" * 10380.

Suggested fix

Enforce a maximum object-nesting depth in the parser and return an Err instead of recursing without bound.

Text from GitHub Advisory Database

Affected versions 2

  • lopdf, rust< 0.42.0GitHub
  • lopdf, crates.iofrom first release, fixed in 0.42.0OSV

References 5