Linux: seg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

seg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA

advance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6 destination address without ensuring the packet data is writable. seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the NEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address.

The skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on the ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() then write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that socket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The simplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg():

__netif_receive_skb_one_core __netif_receive_skb_core deliver_skb [orig: users=2, cloned=0] packet_rcv skb_clone clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket consume_skb(orig) [orig: users=1, cloned=1] ipv6_rcv ip6_rcv_core skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1] [...] input_action_end_core advance_nextseg writes into the data shared with the clone

Call skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data. skb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb->head, which invalidates the pointers into the packet data taken before the call. advance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if skb_ensure_writable() fails. seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination address from the skb after skb_ensure_writable(). On failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM.