In Eclipse Che versions 7.29.0 and later, the GET `/api/scm/resolve` and `POST /api/factory/resolver` endpoints pass an attacker-controlled URL to `URLFetcher.fetch()`, which calls `new URL(url).openC

In Eclipse Che versions 7.29.0 and later, the GET /api/scm/resolve and POST /api/factory/resolver endpoints pass an attacker-controlled URL to URLFetcher.fetch(), which calls new URL(url).openConnection() with no scheme or host allow-list and returns the response body to the caller. Any authenticated Che user can read arbitrary local files via the file:// scheme (including the pod's Kubernetes service-account token at file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token), reach internal HTTP services and cloud instance metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and have their stored SCM personal access token attached as an Authorization header to a host of their choosing. The same credential-forwarding behavior also fires when a victim opens a workspace from a malicious devfile whose parent.uri points to an attacker-controlled server, enabling exfiltration of the victim's SCM PAT without direct API access. No fix is available.