Zammad: S/MIME signature verification allows forged sender impersonation
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, when Zammad checks the digital signature on an incoming S/MIME-signed email, it does not verify that the signing certificate is genuinely trusted, it only checks whether a certificate with a matching name is already stored in the system. An attacker can create their own certificate using the name of a real, previously trusted sender and use it to send a forged email. Zammad will display that email with the same "validly signed" indicator as a genuine message from the real sender, even though the attacker never had access to that sender's actual certificate or private key. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 1
- zammadaffected: < 7.1.2CVE List