Twisted: DNS Response Spoofing in twisted.names Due to Missing Source Address Validation
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.names.dns.DNSDatagramProtocol accepts a UDP DNS response for a pending query when its 16-bit transaction ID matches but does not verify that the response came from the queried host and port. An attacker able to deliver a packet to the resolver's listening port with the correct transaction ID can inject a forged answer. The standard twisted.names.client.Resolver uses a new random source port for each query, increasing off-path attack complexity, while applications that reuse a DNSDatagramProtocol instance expose only the transaction-ID search space after the first query. A successful forgery can redirect hostname resolution and enable mail interception, server-side request forgery, or man-in-the-middle positioning. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 1
- twistedaffected: < 26.7.0rc1CVE List
References 4
- github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/b53e1c3477c209b5609a1c74cf9e48373b5879acFixvia CVE List
- github.com/twisted/twisted/releases/tag/twisted-26.10.0rc1Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/twisted/twisted/security/advisories/GHSA-jj36-9pvh-vj5rAdvisoryvia CVE List
- github.com/twisted/twisted/pull/12700Referencevia CVE List