Termix: Hardcoded default key encrypts all OIDC/WebAuthn users' stored SSH credentials โ full offline decryption from a database copy
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
Termix is a web-based server management platform with SSH terminal, tunneling, and file editing capabilities. From 1.7.0 until 2.5.1, Termix derives the keys that wrap OIDC and WebAuthn users' Data Encryption Keys from committed default strings and the public userId salt in src/backend/utils/user-crypto.ts. Because OIDC_SYSTEM_SECRET and WEBAUTHN_SYSTEM_SECRET are not configured by the project's default deployment artifacts, an attacker with an offline SQLite database copy can derive the wrapping key, recover each affected user's DEK, and decrypt stored SSH passwords, private keys, and key passphrases. Password-authenticated users are not affected by this specific key derivation path. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 1
- Termixaffected: >= 1.7.0, < 2.5.1CVE List
References 5
- github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/commit/401ec7e8fc7d7f63739112e0b0897d6c97208eb8Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/commit/ddbdd5c437c2296607dfaa4265d6f63fbc1ca92eFixvia CVE List
- github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/releases/tag/release-2.5.1-tagFixvia CVE List
- github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/security/advisories/GHSA-685g-ccvv-6p8mExploitvia CVE List
- github.com/Termix-SSH/Termix/pull/1067Referencevia CVE List