Tandoor Recipes: Cross-user IDOR in /api/recipe-from-source/ bookmarklet import โ read and destroy another space member's pending BookmarkletImport
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
Tandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. Prior to 2.6.10, looks up BookmarkletImport by sequential primary key within the active Space without restricting created_by to the requesting user when an authenticated member of a shared Space submits another member's pending bookmarklet identifier to POST /api/recipe-from-source/. Request processing uses api/recipe-from-source/, BookmarkletImport, filter, delete. The attack works because the endpoint parses and returns the victim's stored URL and captured page content, then unconditionally deletes the victim's pending import. This can disclose authenticated or private captured page content and destroy another Space member's pending import. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.10.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 2
- recipesaffected: < 2.6.10CVE List
- TandoorRecipes/recipes<= 2.6.9GitHub