Ember: Unneutralised terminal escape/control sequences from Caddy logs injected into the operator's TUI
What fixes it
- 1.4.2github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember, GoOSV
go get github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember@v1.4.2
A fixed version on one release line is not the upgrade target for every line. Check your exact version and any vendor backports.
Description
Ember is a real-time terminal dashboard for Caddy servers with FrankenPHP support. Prior to 1.4.2, interactive TUI row formatters pass Caddy access-log fields, particularly the request URI, through the fitCellLeft render helper without neutralizing terminal escape or control sequences. An unauthenticated remote client can place ANSI, OSC, or CSI control bytes in an ordinary HTTP request target. Caddy JSON-escapes those bytes, ParseLogLine decodes them back into raw controls, and the formatters concatenate them into View() output reaching os.Stdout. When the operator views the default Logs tab, the terminal interprets these sequences, allowing monitoring-dashboard spoofing, clipboard hijacking through OSC 52, and window-title spoofing through OSC 0/2. This works even with a loopback-only log listener because the input arrives through normal Caddy access logs. Certificates and Routes share secondary unneutralized render sinks. The --json, --once, and daemon --expose modes are unaffected because they do not render an interactive terminal. Consequences depend on the terminal emulator and usually require further operator action to escalate; this is not general-purpose remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.2.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 2
- emberaffected: < 1.4.2CVE List
- github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember, Gofrom first release, fixed in 1.4.2OSV