All vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-33228GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh

Prototype Pollution via parse() in NodeJS flatted

WebReflection flattednpmLibraries & packages
CVSS
8.9High
ExploitationPublic exploit codeCISA's assessment says proof of concept code is public, assessed 24 Mar 2026. Not in the KEV catalogCISA via CVE List
Exploit odds (EPSS)1.28%Chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 69% of CVEs. Scored 23 Oct 2026FIRST EPSS
Fixed in3.4.2Fixed versionGitHub
Published20 Mar 2026Updated 5 Oct 2026CVE List

What fixes it

  • 3.4.2flatted, npmGitHubnpm install flatted@3.4.2

A fixed version on one release line is not the upgrade target for every line. Check your exact version and any vendor backports.

Description

--- Summary

The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "\_\_proto\_\_" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype.

--- Root Cause

File: esm/index.js:29 (identical in cjs/index.js)

  const resolver = (input, lazy, parsed, $) => output => {
    for (let ke = keys(output), {length} = ke, y = 0; y < length; y++) {
      const k = ke[y];
      const value = output[k];    
      if (value instanceof Primitive) {
        const tmp = input[value];      // Bug is here

No validation that value is a safe numeric index input is built as a plain Array. JavaScript's property lookup on arrays traverses the prototype chain for non-numeric keys. The key "\_\_proto\_\_" resolves to Array.prototype, which:

  • has type "object" โ†’ passes the typeof tmp === object guard at line 30
  • is not in the parsed Set yet โ†’ passes the !parsed.has(tmp) guard.
  • The reference to Array.prototype is then enqueued in lazy and later unconditionally assigned to the output object.

--- Replication Steps

  const Flatted = require('flatted'); 
  const parsed = Flatted.parse('[{"x":"__proto__"}]');
  parsed.x.polluted = 'pwned';
  console.log([].polluted);  // Returns true

--- Impact An attacker can supply a crafted flatted string to parse() that causes the returned object to hold a live reference to Array.prototype, enabling any downstream code that writes to that property to pollute the global prototype chain, potentially causing denial of service or code execution.

Recommended solution Validate that the index string represents an integer within the bounds of input before accessing it:

// Before (vulnerable) const tmp = input[value];

// After (safe) const idx = +value; // coerce boxed String โ†’ number const tmp = (Number.isInteger(idx) && idx >= 0 && idx < input.length) ? input[idx] : undefined;

Text from GitHub Advisory Database

Affected versions 3

  • flatted, npm<= 3.4.1GitHub
  • flattedaffected: < 3.4.2CVE List
  • flatted, npmfrom first release, fixed in 3.4.2OSV

References 11