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CVE-2026-19676GHSA-g66q-frxm-3hfg

zephyr: PECI transfer syscall verifier does not validate embedded user buffer pointers, allowing arbitrary kernel memory read/write from user mode

zephyrproject zephyr
CVSS
7.8High
ExploitationNo known exploitationNot in CISA KEV, which does not prove it is unexploitedCISA KEV
Exploit odds (EPSS)0.11%Chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 1% of CVEs. Scored 23 Oct 2026FIRST EPSS
Fixed inNone listedNo source names a fixed version. Check the vendor advisory below
Published21 Oct 2026Updated 23 Oct 2026CVE List

What fixes it

No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.

Description

The user-mode verifier for the peci_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_peci_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_handlers.c, checked only the device object permission and copied the caller-supplied struct peci_msg with k_usermode_from_copy(). That copy validates the outer structure only; the buf pointers and len values inside the embedded struct peci_buf members tx_buffer and rx_buffer remained fully caller-controlled and were passed unchecked to the driver.

Every in-tree PECI driver dereferences those pointers in supervisor mode: peci_npcx_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_npcx.c and peci_it8xxx2_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_ite_it8xxx2.c copy hardware bytes into rx_buffer.buf[i] and read command bytes out of tx_buffer.buf[i], and peci_xec_read()/peci_xec_write() in drivers/peci/peci_mchp_xec.c do the same with no bound on rx_buffer.len at all. A user-mode thread that has been granted the PECI device object — the normal way an application exposes a device under CONFIG_USERSPACE — could therefore point rx_buffer.buf at kernel data structures and have the driver write hardware-supplied bytes there, or point tx_buffer.buf at kernel memory and have its contents pushed onto the PECI/eSPI out-of-band bus.

The impact is a full user-mode-to-kernel escape: an arbitrary kernel write primitive (integrity and, through it, code execution at supervisor privilege), an arbitrary kernel read disclosed to a PECI bus observer, and a trivially reachable supervisor-mode fault if an unmapped address is supplied. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, one of the PECI drivers enabled (CONFIG_PECI_NPCX, CONFIG_PECI_XEC or CONFIG_PECI_ITE_IT8XXX2), and local code execution in a user-mode thread holding the PECI device.

The fix adds K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() and K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE() checks over the two embedded buffers, with a size_add_overflow() guard on the frame-check-sequence byte accounted for in the RX length.

Text from CVE List

Affected versions 1

  • zephyraffected: 2.3.0 through 4.4.2CVE List

References 2