russh's SSH client is susceptible to unbounded allocations via EXT_INFO packets
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to 0.65.0, the client Session::process_packet path in russh/src/client/encrypted.rs accepts repeated packets encoded with russh's private msg::EXT_INFO = 7 before authentication, while the standards-compliant EXT_INFO message number 82 does not reach the affected handler. The handle_ext_info function appends every parsed extension name to received_extensions without clearing, deduplicating, or bounding the vector. A malicious SSH server that deliberately sends private message number 7 can therefore retain an unbounded number of attacker-controlled extension names for the session lifetime, causing progressive client memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 1
- russhaffected: < 0.65.0CVE List