Vaultwarden: Icon endpoint SSRF fix bypass via second-stage favicon IP literal URLs
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
Vaultwarden is a Bitwarden-compatible server written in Rust. Prior to version 1.37.0, the Vaultwarden icon downloader validates the initial icon host and DNS results but passes favicon URLs parsed from attacker-controlled HTML to get_page_with_referer() without applying should_block_host() to the second-stage host. This flaw bypasses the remediation for CVE-2026-47160, which covered decimal, hexadecimal, octal, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 host normalization, because the second-stage IP-literal favicon fetch does not invoke the custom DNS resolver. A remote unauthenticated attacker can provide a public page whose favicon uses an IP-literal URL, allowing the Vaultwarden server to reach loopback or private and internal addresses. The issue affects instances with internal icon downloading enabled and can expose internal responses that resemble supported images or reveal reachability through timing, status, and cache behavior. This issue is fixed in version 1.37.0.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 1
- vaultwardenaffected: < 1.37.0CVE List
References 4
- github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/commit/46ae59eaf444f0ae0a799070cf2bd6c415284a51Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.0Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5Advisoryvia CVE List
- github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7472Referencevia CVE List