social-core: Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the attacker in as the victim
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim's unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker's browser, submit the victim's code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 1
- social-coreaffected: < 6.2.0CVE List
References 4
- github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/commit/c2f2ae4663bef19ee8b07f2cf5a2344f9155d826Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/releases/tag/6.2.0Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/security/advisories/GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935Advisoryvia CVE List
- github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/2141Referencevia CVE List