djangorestframework: Django REST framework: TokenProxy.delete() reports success and revokes nothing
What fixes it
- 3.18.2djangorestframework, pipGitHub
- 3.18.2djangorestframework, PyPIOSV
pip install "djangorestframework>=3.18.2"
A fixed version on one release line is not the upgrade target for every line. Check your exact version and any vendor backports.
Description
Summary
Deleting an authentication token through TokenProxy silently deletes nothing. The call raises no exception and reports success, the database row survives, and the token keeps authenticating. Any application, admin integration or operational script that revokes credentials by calling .delete() on a TokenProxy instance believes it has revoked a token that is still live.
Details
TokenProxy overrides pk to return the user id (rest_framework/authtoken/models.py:49-63):
@property
def pk(self):
return self.user_idThe concrete Token model keys on key, not on an integer id. Model.delete() builds its delete query from pk, so it emits:
DELETE FROM "authtoken_token" WHERE "authtoken_token"."key" IN ('1')That matches a user id against the 40-character key column. Nothing matches, nothing raises, and the call returns (0, {'authtoken.TokenProxy': 0}).
DRF already ships two workarounds for this same identity mismatch instead of a fix. In rest_framework/authtoken/admin.py, TokenAdmin.delete_model re-fetches the concrete row:
def delete_model(self, request, obj):
Token.objects.get(key=obj.key).delete() # admin.py:30and TokenAdmin sets actions = None with the comment "Actions not compatible with mapped IDs" (admin.py:50-53). The shipped admin path is therefore safe, and every other caller of TokenProxy.delete() is not. Nothing in the API signals the difference.
TokenProxy was added by e2bd3b6a (PR #7341, "Adjusted token admin to map to user ID"), first released in 3.12.0.
A fix would drop the pk override, or give TokenProxy a delete() that operates on the concrete row, or raise instead of silently reporting zero deletions.
PoC
Save as poc_tokenproxy_revocation.py and run it.
#!/usr/bin/env python
"""
django-rest-framework: TokenProxy.delete() reports success and revokes nothing.
baseline token exists -> 200
TRIGGER TokenProxy.objects.get(...).delete() -> no exception, row survives, still 200
CONTROL Token.objects.get(key=...).delete() -> row gone, 401
The control is what makes the trigger meaningful: it proves the row was
deletable and the credential check live, so the 200 after the proxy delete is a
failed revocation and not a broken harness.
Requires: django, djangorestframework importable. No arguments.
python poc_tokenproxy_revocation.py
Exit status 0 means the revocation failure reproduced.
"""
import sys
import django
from django.conf import settings
settings.configure(
DEBUG=False,
SECRET_KEY="poc",
ALLOWED_HOSTS=["*"],
ROOT_URLCONF=__name__,
INSTALLED_APPS=[
"django.contrib.contenttypes",
"django.contrib.auth",
"rest_framework",
"rest_framework.authtoken",
],
DATABASES={"default": {"ENGINE": "django.db.backends.sqlite3", "NAME": ":memory:"}},
DEFAULT_AUTO_FIELD="django.db.models.AutoField",
USE_TZ=True,
)
django.setup()
from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model # noqa: E402
from django.core.management import call_command # noqa: E402
from django.db import connection # noqa: E402
from django.test import Client # noqa: E402
from django.test.utils import CaptureQueriesContext # noqa: E402
from django.urls import path # noqa: E402
from rest_framework.authentication import TokenAuthentication # noqa: E402
from rest_framework.authtoken.models import Token, TokenProxy # noqa: E402
from rest_framework.permissions import IsAuthenticated # noqa: E402
from rest_framework.response import Response # noqa: E402
from rest_framework.views import APIView # noqa: E402
class Whoami(APIView):
authentication_classes = [TokenAuthentication]
permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated]
def get(self, request):
return Response({"user": request.user.get_username()})
urlpatterns = [path("", Whoami.as_view())]
def probe(client, key):
response = client.get("/", headers={"authorization": "Token %s" % key})
return response.status_code
def main():
call_command("migrate", run_syncdb=True, verbosity=0)
user = get_user_model().objects.create_user(username="revoke-user", password="pw")
key = Token.objects.create(user=user).key
client = Client()
print("TokenProxy._meta.proxy =", TokenProxy._meta.proxy)
print("Token._meta.pk.attname =", Token._meta.pk.attname)
print("user.pk =", user.pk)
print("token key =", key)
print("\n--- baseline")
print("rows =", Token.objects.count())
baseline = probe(client, key)
print("GET / with token ->", baseline)
print("\n--- TRIGGER: delete through the proxy")
proxy = TokenProxy.objects.get(user=user)
print("proxy.pk =", proxy.pk, "(TokenProxy.pk property)")
raised = None
with CaptureQueriesContext(connection) as ctx:
try:
returned = proxy.delete()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
raised, returned = exc, None
for q in ctx.captured_queries:
if "DELETE" in q["sql"]:
print(" SQL:", q["sql"])
print("raised =", repr(raised))
print("returned =", returned)
print("rows =", Token.objects.count())
after_proxy = probe(client, key)
print("GET / with token ->", after_proxy)
print("\n--- CONTROL: delete the same row through the concrete model")
with CaptureQueriesContext(connection) as ctx2:
returned2 = Token.objects.get(key=key).delete()
for q in ctx2.captured_queries:
if "DELETE" in q["sql"]:
print(" SQL:", q["sql"])
print("returned =", returned2)
print("rows =", Token.objects.count())
after_real = probe(client, key)
print("GET / with token ->", after_real)
ok = baseline == 200 and raised is None and after_proxy == 200 and after_real == 401
print(
"\nrevocation failure reproduced:", ok,
"(baseline 200, still 200 after proxy delete, 401 after real delete)",
)
return 0 if ok else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())Observed output:
TokenProxy._meta.proxy = True
Token._meta.pk.attname = key
user.pk = 1
token key = 6a644878f252175d39205804c5a6faf16df67c10
--- baseline
rows = 1
GET / with token -> 200
--- TRIGGER: delete through the proxy
proxy.pk = 1 (TokenProxy.pk property)
SQL: DELETE FROM "authtoken_token" WHERE "authtoken_token"."key" IN ('1')
raised = None
returned = (0, {'authtoken.TokenProxy': 0})
rows = 1
GET / with token -> 200
--- CONTROL: delete the same row through the concrete model
SQL: DELETE FROM "authtoken_token" WHERE "authtoken_token"."key" IN ('6a644878...')
returned = (1, {'authtoken.Token': 1})
rows = 0
GET / with token -> 401
revocation failure reproduced: TrueThe control is what makes the trigger meaningful: it proves the row was deletable and the credential check live, so the 200 after the proxy delete is a failed revocation and not a broken harness. Reproduced identically on Django 6.1 and 5.2.17 LTS, so this is not a recent Django regression.
Impact
Failed credential revocation. An operator who revokes a token through a TokenProxy instance, and receives no error, leaves a live credential in circulation indefinitely, because DRF auth tokens do not expire on their own. Whoever holds that token benefits: a departed employee, a rotated integration, a device believed to be deprovisioned, or an attacker whose access was thought to have been cut during incident response.
No untrusted input reaches this code path, which is why the vector is scored AC:H. Exploitation depends on the deployment revoking through the proxy, which is a natural thing to do given TokenProxy is the model registered in the admin and the one most code will reach for. Any deployment on 3.12.0 or later that revokes tokens outside DRF's own TokenAdmin.delete_model should audit whether its revocations took effect.
Text from GitHub Advisory Database
Affected versions 21
- djangorestframework, pip>= 3.12.0, < 3.18.2GitHub
- django-rest-frameworkaffected: >= 3.12.0, < 3.18.2CVE List
- djangorestframework, PyPIfrom 3.12.0, fixed in 3.18.2OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.12.0OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.12.1OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.12.2OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.12.3OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.12.4OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.13.0OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.13.1OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.14.0OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.15.0OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.15.1OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.15.2OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.16.0OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.16.1OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.17.0OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.17.1OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.17.2OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.18.0OSV
- djangorestframework, PyPI3.18.1OSV
References 5
- github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/af3fabfd517307fbc5d500fba1ab8f6e25f220b0Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/releases/tag/3.18.2Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-xw6w-gcfp-cf8mAdvisoryvia CVE List
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-xw6w-gcfp-cf8mAdvisoryvia GitHub
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114137Referencevia GitHub