An IPv6 FlowSpec validation bypass in the CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon allows an established BGP peer to inject FlowSpec rules matching destinations outside the address space authorized by the
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Description
An IPv6 FlowSpec validation bypass in the CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon allows an established BGP peer to inject FlowSpec rules matching destinations outside the address space authorized by the unicast-route validation procedure. With validation enabled on the receiving flow6 channel, BIRD fails to reject a destination prefix component with a nonzero offset, contrary to RFC 8956 section 5. It validates a reconstructed prefix with zero-filled skipped bits, although the original FlowSpec component can match a broader set of IPv6 addresses. Given a suitable unicast route from the peer, the rule can pass validation and, where export policy permits, be propagated to downstream peers. Downstream enforcement may cause unauthorized traffic filtering or redirection.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 2
- BIRDaffected: 2.0.9 through 2.20.0CVE List
- BIRDaffected: 3.0.0 through 3.4.0CVE List
References 4
- gitlab.nic.cz/labs/bird/-/commit/7cf75587b6f38b87849fe192bf5dfd124b7702bcFixvia CVE List
- rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8956.html#section-5Referencevia CVE List
- gitlab.nic.cz/labs/bird/-/blob/v2.20.0/nest/rt-table.c#L2686Referencevia CVE List
- gitlab.nic.cz/labs/bird/-/blob/v3.4.0/nest/rt-table.c#L4518Referencevia CVE List