All vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-111115

Apache Kafka: Broker OutOfMemoryError via tagged-field allocation amplification in flexible protocol request parsing

Apache Software Foundation Apache Kafka
CVSS
NoneNot scored
ExploitationNo known exploitationNot in CISA KEV, which does not prove it is unexploitedCISA KEV
Exploit odds (EPSS)No scoreNo FIRST EPSS score in this snapshot yet
Fixed inNone listedNo source names a fixed version. Check the vendor advisory below
Published28 Oct 2026Updated 28 Oct 2026CVE List

What fixes it

No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.

Reports 1

1 outlet mention it. Reports are not confirmation; each links to its source.

Description

Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions read a tagged-field count declared by the sender and retain a RawTaggedField object for each unknown field. That count was bounded only by the outer request frame size (socket.request.max.bytes); it was not checked against the remaining buffer bytes or capped. Because each entry can be encoded in as little as two bytes (unknown tag 0, size 0), a modest request can declare tens of millions of tagged fields and force one object allocation per declared field. Flexible request headers (header version 2, used by flexible APIs such as ApiVersions v3) are parsed this way, so the amplification applies to the request header itself.

Impact: The flexible request header is parsed on the network thread before authorization, request dispatch, and request-time quota accounting. A client can send a request of a few tens of megabytes whose header declares about 20 million tagged fields, forcing roughly that many RawTaggedField allocations and exhausting broker heap or inducing process-wide GC stalls, denying broker service. Because the header is parsed for pre-authentication APIs such as ApiVersions (v3), the allocation can occur before authentication; no Kafka resource ACL or quota is required.

Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure.

Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers bounds-check the tagged-field count for flexible-versioned messages, rejecting a negative count, a count exceeding the remaining buffer bytes, or a count exceeding a fixed maximum (10,000), before any per-field allocation.

Text from CVE List

Affected versions 3

  • Apache Kafkaaffected: 2.4.0 through 4.1.2CVE List
  • Apache Kafkaaffected: 4.2.0 through 4.2.1CVE List
  • Apache Kafkaaffected: 4.3.0 through 4.3.1CVE List

References 1