CVE-2026-108362GHSA-pj2x-5wqv-fh57
ra-tls-clients: Privasys attested TLS accepted evidence from any unrevoked TEE platform (diversion attack)
Privasys ra-tls-clients
CVSS
9.1CriticalExploitationNo known exploitationNot in CISA KEV, which does not prove it is unexploitedCISA KEV
Exploit odds (EPSS)0.16%Chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 4% of CVEs. Scored 23 Oct 2026FIRST EPSS
What fixes it
- 0.11.0Privasys/ra-tls-clients, otherGitHub
A fixed version on one release line is not the upgrade target for every line. Check your exact version and any vendor backports.
Description
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 2
- ra-tls-clientsaffected: < 0.11.0CVE List
- Privasys/ra-tls-clients, other<= v0.10.0GitHub