Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data in Malcolm
What fixes it
No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.
Reports 1
1 outlet mention it. Reports are not confirmation; each links to its source.
Description
Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 2
- Malcolmaffected: all versions through 26.07.1CVE List
- Malcolmunaffected: 26.08.0CVE List