probe-image-size: Quadratic-time Denial of Service in the SVG Parser
What fixes it
- 7.4.0probe-image-size, npmGitHub
npm install probe-image-size@7.4.0
A fixed version on one release line is not the upgrade target for every line. Check your exact version and any vendor backports.
Description
Overview
probe-image-size scans the SVG header with a searching regular expression, /<[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^>]*>/. On input that contains many < characters but no >, the engine restarts the [^>]* scan at every < position and runs to end of input each time, giving quadratic time complexity.
Both the synchronous and the streaming parser are affected.
Impact
Every entry point that reaches the SVG parser is affected: probe.sync(), probe(stream) and probe(url). The URL form is the most exposed one — the input is fetched from a remote host, so an attacker only needs to supply a link.
Processing a crafted buffer blocks the Node.js event loop at 100% CPU for the whole duration. In production environments such as upload validators, image proxies or link unfurl services, a small number of concurrent requests is enough to deny service.
Root Cause Analysis
Two independent problems.
- Absence of input size cap in the sync path.
lib/parse_sync/svg.jscopied the entire buffer into a string and matched against it. There was no size limit at all, so cost scaled with the size of the attacker-supplied buffer.
- Repeated rescanning in the stream path.
lib/parse_stream/svg.jsdid cap accumulated data at 64 KB, but calledparseSvg(str)on the whole accumulated string on *every* chunk, givingO(chunks × N²). The cap does not help here: the more chunks the input is split into, the more times the quadratic scan is repeated.
Chunk size is influenced by the sender. highWaterMark (16 KB) is a buffering threshold, not a lower bound — a socket read returns whatever has arrived. A server that writes one byte at a time produces one-byte chunks; this was confirmed against the real needle pipeline with default options.
The original report identified (1) only, and stated that the 64 KB cap mitigates the streaming path. It does not.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Synchronous:
const probe = require('probe-image-size')
// ~200 KB of '<a' — contains '<' but never '>'
probe.sync(Buffer.from('<a'.repeat(100000), 'latin1'))Streaming — the same payload split into chunks, slower per byte than the synchronous form:
const { Readable } = require('stream')
const probe = require('probe-image-size')
const payload = Buffer.from('<a'.repeat(32768), 'latin1')
const chunks = []
for (let i = 0; i < payload.length; i += 4096) chunks.push(payload.subarray(i, i + 4096))
await probe(Readable.from(chunks))Measurements on the maintainer's machine:
| path | input | time | | --- | --- | --- | | probe.sync() | 25 KB | 0.9 s | | probe.sync() | 50 KB | 5.5 s | | probe.sync() | 100 KB | 18 s | | probe.sync() | 200 KB | 54 s | | probe(stream) | 64 KB, 1 chunk | 1.6 s | | probe(stream) | 64 KB, 4 chunks | 2.9 s | | probe(stream) | 64 KB, 16 chunks | 9.6 s |
Text from GitHub Advisory Database
Affected versions 3
- probe-image-size, npm<= 7.3.0GitHub
- probe-image-sizeaffected: < 7.4.0CVE List
- probe-image-size, npmfrom first release, fixed in 7.4.0OSV
References 7
- github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/commit/60cc96ac0b671e79e328213d0a8e831312b09e84Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/commit/9b74656d6f973cc59ea2ab1375c0d88390a402adFixvia CVE List
- github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/commit/c032aefabdecf5cb50548ab9ba175db56353078fFixvia CVE List
- github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/releases/tag/7.4.0Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-gjj5-9665-rwrcAdvisoryvia GitHub
- github.com/nodeca/probe-image-size/security/advisories/GHSA-gjj5-9665-rwrcExploitvia CVE List
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104861Referencevia GitHub