bc-csharp: Name constraints bypass via trailing dot in rfc822Name, dNSName and URI hosts
What fixes it
- 2.7.0bc-csharpCVE List
A fixed version on one release line is not the upgrade target for every line. Check your exact version and any vendor backports.
Description
Improper certificate validation in PkixNameConstraintValidator in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows an attacker who controls, or can obtain certificates from, a name-constrained intermediate CA to have certificates accepted during PKIX certification path validation for email addresses, DNS names or URI hosts that lie within excluded subtrees applying to that CA, via an rfc822Name, dNSName or uniformResourceIdentifier name whose host ends with a dot, because names and constraints were compared without first removing the RFC 1034 root-label trailing dot, so a fully qualified host name did not match an excluded subtree for the same host written without the dot.
Text from CVE List
Affected versions 1
- bc-csharpaffected: all versions before 2.7.0CVE List
References 4
- github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/f196a22bbf7765cc19b0c4f4645c74ea7ad35e09Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/be276e057775a6a674a62e9d9a2583b229978f73Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/75c3c576602886180ed92a63c89419e3bd63b392Fixvia CVE List
- github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/wiki/CVE-2026-103602Advisoryvia CVE List