All vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-102716GHSA-q462-246c-x3jc

eclipse-threadx/netxduo: An unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests that carry a Session header the parser cannot convert. The Session branch returns the raw NetX e

Eclipse Foundation eclipse-threadx/netxduo
CVSS
8.7High
ExploitationNo known exploitationNot in CISA KEV, which does not prove it is unexploitedCISA KEV
Exploit odds (EPSS)0.25%Chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 15% of CVEs. Scored 23 Oct 2026FIRST EPSS
Fixed inNone listedNo source names a fixed version. Check the vendor advisory below
Published29 Sep 2026Updated 29 Sep 2026CVE List

What fixes it

No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.

Description

An unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests

that carry a Session header the parser cannot convert.

The Session branch returns the raw NetX error code instead of an RTSP status code:



/* addons/rtsp/nx_rtsp_server.c:2754 */



status = _nx_utility_string_to_uint(field_value_ptr, field_value_length, &session_id);



if (status)



{

    return(status);      /* NX_INVALID_PARAMETERS / NX_SIZE_ERROR / NX_OVERFLOW */


}


Every other branch of the same function maps its failure to an RTSP status first. The CSeq branch

eighteen lines earlier does exactly that (line 2736 returns NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST). The

raw code then reaches _nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send (nx_rtsp_server.c:1234), which does not

recognise it, takes a path that returns without releasing the response packet it already allocated,

and the block never goes back to the pool.

Six requests with an empty Session header against a 22 packet pool:



valid requests:      after request 6: pool available = 21,  AFTER = 22 / 22



malformed requests:  after request 6: pool available = 16,  AFTER = 17 / 22


One block per request, not returned when the client disconnects. Twenty six requests take the pool

to zero and the server starts failing allocations, after which it serves nobody. If the pool is

shared with the rest of the application, as it is in the shipped sample, the rest of the stack

stops with it.

Convert the _nx_utility_string_to_uint failure in the Session branch into

NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST the way the CSeq branch does, and release the response packet on

every exit path of _nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send.

Text from CVE List

Affected versions 1

  • eclipse-threadx/netxduoaffected: all versions through 6.5.1CVE List

References 1