All vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-100413GHSA-hqp5-j79g-vr89

SeaweedFS: Hard-coded SSH host key can be presented by certain standalone SFTP Helm deployments

seaweedfs seaweedfs
CVSS
7.0High
ExploitationNo known exploitationNot in CISA KEV, which does not prove it is unexploitedCISA KEV
Exploit odds (EPSS)0.42%Chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 35% of CVEs. Scored 23 Oct 2026FIRST EPSS
Fixed inNone listedNo source names a fixed version. Check the vendor advisory below
Published14 Oct 2026Updated 14 Oct 2026CVE List

What fixes it

No source in this snapshot names a fixed version. The vendor advisories under References are the place to check.

Description

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. From 4.0.388 until 4.41, the SFTP Helm chart embedded one unencrypted Ed25519 private host key in k8s/charts/seaweedfs/templates/sftp/sftp-secret.yaml as stringData.seaweedfs_sftp_ssh_private_key. A standalone deployment presented that public key when sftp.enabled and sftp.enableAuth were true, sftp.existingConfigSecret was not supplied, the legacy sftp.sshPrivateKey path remained selected, a valid config-ssh Secret allowed startup, and hostKeysFolder did not provide a later Ed25519 signer. An attacker able to redirect or intercept client traffic could impersonate that SFTP endpoint to clients that trusted the published host identity, exposing password credentials or data sent to the rogue endpoint. Default all-in-one and non-authenticated standalone paths did not load the key. This issue is fixed in version 4.41.

Text from CVE List

Affected versions 1

  • seaweedfsaffected: >= 4.0.388, < 4.41CVE List

References 4